

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 AF-06 ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4206
INFO USUN NEW YORK 1921
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
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UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 5052

E.O. 11652:NA
TAGS: PARM CCD
SUBJ: CCD-NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE STUDY, STATEMENT BY US REP

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY US REP MARTIN AT
MEETING AT NFZ EXPRTS JULY 1.
BEGIN TEXT.

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS ON SOME OF THE
WORKING PAPERS PRESENTED DURING THE PAST WEEK. I RECOGNIZE
THAT IT MIGHT BE A BETTER PROCEDURE IF THE U.S. DELEGATION
BEGAN BY SUBMITTING WORKING PAPERS ON ITW OWN. HOWEVER, AS WE
ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO DO THAT TODAY, WE THINK IT NOT
SOME COMMENTS ON THE PAPERS OF OTHERS MIGHT BE IN ORDER. THIS
IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN VIEW OF THE CHAIRMAN'S PREDICTION THAT
FIRST DRAFT OF CHAPTERS WILL BEGIN TO APPEAR THIS WEEK.
MY DELEGATION HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED THE DRAFT CHAPTER II PREPARED
BY THE SECRETARIAT. I WISH TO CONGRATULATE THE UN
DISARMAMENT DIVISION FOR ITS GOOD WORK IN PRODUCING WHAT SEEMS
ON THE WHOLE TO BE A BALANCED AS WELL AS COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT.
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I WOULD LIKE TO JOIN THE CHAIRMAN AND OTHER EXPERTS, HOWEVER,

IN SUGGESTING THAT THE DRAFT BE CONDENSED CONSIDERABLY.
AS A PRELIMINARY COMMENT ON THE DRAFT CHAPTER II, I WISH
TO SUGGEST THAT LINES 5-12 OF PAGE 28, WHICH CONCERNS THE
AFRICAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE PROPOSAL, BE REVISED TO READ AS
FOLLOWS:

"THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE AT THE
EARLY STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFRICAN PROPOSAL TO ENUMERATE
THE SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES THAT SHOULD BE ASSUMED BY OUTSIDE
STATES AND THAT SUCH UNDERTAKINGS SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF
FURTHER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE REGION AND THE
OUTSIDE STATES".

THIS WOULD BE CLOSER TO HISTORICAL FACT SINCE THE US
DID NOT--AS INDICATED IN THE TEXT--REFER TO FOUR CRITERIA
IN DISCUSSING THE AFRICAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE PROPOSAL AT THE UN,
ALTHOUGH WE OF COURSE REGARD THE CRITERIA TO WHICH THE DRAFT REFERS TO
AS GUIDELINES THAT SHOULD BE APPLIED IN ASSESSING ANY
SUCH PROPOSAL. I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE REVISION I PROPOSE
WOULD REQUIRE SOME MODIFICATION IN ONE FOOTNOTE AND IN THE
SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE REFERRING TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. WE WILL
PROVIDE THE SECRETARIAT WITH THE WRITTEN TEXT OF OUR SUGGESTED
REVISION. WE ARE CONTINUING TO REVIEW THE DRAFT CHAPTER II,
AND WE MAY WISH TO MAKE A FEW MORE SUGGESTIONS AT A FUTURE TIME.
TURNING NOW TO THE INTERESTING WORKING PAPER #5 SUBMITTED BY
THE SWEDISH EXPERT, I WISH TO RAISE A GENERAL QUESTION
CONCERNING ONE OF ITS ELEMENTS. THIS PAPER INTRODUCES THE
CONCEPT, MOST FULLY STATED IN PARA 6, OF AN AD HOC AGREE-
MENT AMONG NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES TO THREAT CERTAIN AREAS AS
NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES "IN TIMES OF WAR AND CRISIS". WHILE
THIS CONCEPT MIGHT USEFULLY BE EXAMINED IN AN APPROPRIATE
INTERNATIONAL FORUM, I WOULD QUESTION WHETHER IT IS A PROPER
SUBJECT FOR INCLUSION IN OUR STUDY. AS THE SWEDISH PAPER NOTES,
AN AD HOC AGREEMENT WOULD DIFFER IN PURPOSE--BEING PRIMARILY
HUMANITARIAN--AS WELL AS IN FORM FROM THE SUBJECT OF OUR STUDY.
THE REFERENCE IN THE SWEDISH PAPER TO THE DISCUSSION OF DEL-
MILITARIZED ZONES AT THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS FURTHER SUGGESTS
THAT THIS IDEA OF AD HOC AGREEMENTS IS OUTSIDE OUR MANDATE.
MY NEXT COMMENT REFERS TO THE MEXICAN WORKING PAPER,
WP/7. QUITE FRANKLY, THE GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THIS PAPER
(PARAS 1-5) GIVES MY DELEGATION SOME PROBLEMS. IN OUR
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VIEW IT DOES NOT ADEQUATELY ANALYZE THE FACTORS THAT ARE
INVOLVED IN THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEIR IMPACT
ON NATIONAL POLICY, AND THEIR ROLE IN RELATION TO SECURITY.
IF THE INTENTION IS TO INCORPORATE IN THE STUDY THE VIEWS
EXPRESSED IN PARAS 1 THROUGH 5 OF THE WORKING MEXICAN WORKING
PAPER, WE THINK THIS WOULD POSE VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN
ACHIEVING A BALANCED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THOSE
PARAS. HOWEVER, WE THINK THESE PROBLEMS CAN AND SHOULD

BE AVOIDED, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS KIND OF INTRODUCTION IS NOT RELEVANT TTH QUESTIONS POSED IN SECTION III (1) OF THE OUTLINE. THE MEXICAN WORKING PAPER SUBSEQUENTLY ADDRESSES THESE QUESTIONS WITH CONSIDERABLE COGENCY, BEGINNING WITH PARA 6.

MY DELEGATION HAS NOTED WITH INTREST THE COMMENTS IN PARA 14 OF THE MEXICAN PAPER, PARTICULARLY THE IDEA THAT NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONES COULD SERVE AS A STARTING POINT FOR THE ADOPTION OF DISARMAMENT MEASURESIN OTHER FIELDS, SUCH AS CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, ON A REGIONAL BASIS. WE NOTE THAT SIMILAR CONCEPTS APPEAR IN THE UK AND AUSTRALIAN PAPERS. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IDEA DESERVES ADEQUATE ATTENTION IN THE EXPERTS' STUDY.

THS REFERENCE IN THE MEXICAN PAPER (E.G., PARA 23) TO QUESTIONS OF CONTROL OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES PROMPTS ME TO RAISE A SPECIFIC POINT REGARDING THE LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY. PERHAPS I SHOULD ADDRESS THIS COMMENT NOT ONLY TO THS DISTINGUISHED MEXICAN EXPERT, BUT ALSO TO THE CHAIRMAN SINCE HE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE AUTHORITIES OF OPANAL. MY POINT IS SIMPLY THIS. THE VERIFICATION AND CONTROL PRACTICES OF TH LANFZ TREATY WOULD SEEM MOST RELEVANT TO OUR STUDY. I WOULD HOPE THAT, IN COMMENTING ON THE OUTLINE, OPANAL COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THISACTUAL OPERATIONS OF ITS CONTROL SYSTEM, WHICH I UNDERSTAND COMPREHENDS BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS. I NOW TURN TO THE IRANIAN PAPER, WORKING PAPER 10. WE WISH TO SUPPORT THE REALISTIC EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF NWFZ' ON PAGE 3 OF THAT PAPER. TO PARAPHRASE THE IRANIAN TEXT: REGIONAL SOLUTIONS MAY PROVE USEFUL IN SOME AREAS, NOT IN OTHERS. OR, TO QUOTE THE WORKING PAPER ITSELF, "THERE ARE AREAS WHERE IT (THAT IS,THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FRE ZONES) MAY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE".I HOPE THAT OUR STUDY CAN ADOPT

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EA-10 EUR-12 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NASA-02 NEA-10

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THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH THAT LIES BEHIND THESE WORDS. I NOTE THAT THIS PART OF THE IRANIAN WORKING IS RELATED TO THE DISCUSSION OF "OBJECTIVES" IN SECTION III (1). THE SAME POINT SHOULD, IN OUR VIEW, ALSO BE STRESSED IN SECTION III (2) ON REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. WE SUGGEST IN PARTICULAR THAT THE STUDY MAKE CLEAR THAT THE PRIMARY "REGIONAL CONSIDERATION" WILL BE WHETHER A PARTICULAR REGION IS, OR IS NOT, SUITABLE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES. I NOTE THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE IRANIAN WORKING PAPER REFERS TO THE LIMITATIONS OF STUDIES SUCH AS OURS. THIS SEEMS TO US TO BE THE COUNSEL OF WISDOM. IN THE INTEREST OF A BALANCED AND USEFUL STUDY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OUR STUDY NOT CLAIM TOO MUCH FOR NWFZ'S BUT MAKE A REASONED ASSESSMENT OF THEIR POTENTIAL VALUE; AND ALSO THAT IT NOT PURPORT TO BE A DO-IT-YOURSELF GUIDE FOR FORMING NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, BUT GIVE US WEIGHT TO THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SUBJECT. I AM CERTAIN THAT WE CAN ALL AGREE ON THE GENERAL PROPOSITION THAT OUR STUDY SHOULD BE BALANCED AND ANALYTICAL, RATHER THAN POLEMICAL OR PROPAGANDISTIC. WORKING PAPER NO. 11, SUBMITTED BY THE FINNISH EXPERT, CONTAINS A CONCEPT WHICH WE HOPE CAN BE CLARIFIED FURTHER. UNCLASSIFIED

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THE PAPER EMPHASIZES THE POINT THAT THE SECURITY CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY COUNTRIES WITHIN A ZONE--OR A PROPOSED ZONE--SHOULD BE "ACCEPTED AT THEIR FACE VALUE" BY OTHER STATES. THE PREMISE UNDERLYING THE FINNISH PAPER SEEMS TO BE THAT A SHARP DISCONTINUITY INVARIABLY EXISTS BETWEEN THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF COUNTRIES WITHIN A PROPOSED NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE AND THOSE OUTSIDE IT. WE QUESTION THIS CONCEPT. WE THINK THAT THE REALITY IS MUCH MORE COMPLEX THAN THIS WOULD IMPLY. IN MANY CASES THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF STATES WITHIN A REGION ARE SO CLOSELY LINKED WITH THOSE OUTSIDE THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SPEAK OF THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE ZONAL STATES" AS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THOSE OF OTHER STATES ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. WE BELIEVE THAT POTENTIAL PARTIES OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES. AND OTHER STATES INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, FACE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME QUESTION WHEN THEY CONSIDER ANY NUCLEAR FREE ZONE PROPOSAL, NAMELY HOW TO ASSESS THE PROPOSED ZONE IN RELATION TO ALTERNATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AVAILABLE TO THEM. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS, WHATEVER THEIR FORM, ARE

THE MEANS TO AN OBJECTIVE, THE STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ARRANGEMENTS. I SHOULD ADD THAT IN SOME AREAS, NOTABLY IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, WHERE SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED THAT SEEM ESSENTIAL TO THE PRESERVATION OF SECURITY, WE THINK IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS BY NUCLEAR FREE ZONES.

WORKING PAPER NO. 12, SUBMITTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERT, MAKES THE POINT ON PAGE 3 THAT THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT IN NUCLEAR FREE ZONES INCORPORATING AREAS OF THE HIGH SEAS". IT IS, INDEED, DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF ANY MEANS OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH A MARITIME NWFZ ARRANGEMENT SHORT OF INSTITUTING A RIGHT OF INTERCEPTION AND INSPECTION OF VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS. WE BELIEVE THAT FEW, IF ANY COUNTRIES WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SUCH A MEANS. IN OUR VIEW, THERE ARE OTHER SERIOUS POLITICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS THAT MAKE THE EXTENSION OF NWFZ'S TO THE HIGH SEAS UNREALISTIC AND UNACCEPTABLE, BUT WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THAT THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM RAISED IN THE AUSTRALIAN PAPER IS A VALID CONSIDERATION THAT SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE STUDY.

FINALLY, I WISH TO MAKE A COMMENT ABOUT THE WORKING PAPERS GENERALLY AND TO ADDRESS A REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE TO THE CHAIR.

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THE WORKING PAPERS SUBMITTED SO FAR HAVE ALREADY REVEALED DIFFERENT OR CONFLICTING VIEWS ON ISSUES, MANY OF WHICH ARE IMPORTANT. THIS IS, OF COURSE, NO SURPRISE TO ANY OF US, AS INDICATED BY THE GUIDELINES DEVELOPED FOR THIS STUDY-GUIDELINES DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE BALANCE AND TO REFLECT VIEWS OF INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS IF NECESSARY. TO CITE AN EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENCES IN VIEW MERGING IN THE WORKING PAPERS, SOME EXPERTS SEEM TO REGARD MEMBERSHIP IN A MILITARY ALLIANCE AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH PARTICIPATION IN A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE. OTHER EXPERTS INDICATE, ON THE CONTRARY, THAT SUCH ALLIANCES MAY BE COMPATIBLE WITH PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR FREE ZONES UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

ANOTHER AREA OF DIFFERENCE CONCERNS THE QUESTION WHETHER NUCLEAR FREE ZONES CAN BE EXTENDED BEYOND NATIONAL TERRITORIES TO INCLUDE THE HIGH SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE. THERE IS ALSO DISAGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF TRANSIT THROUGH ZONES. THE FULL LIST ON SUCH ISSUES ALREADY IDENTIFIED WOULD BE MUCH LONGER. MY PURPOSE IN RAISING THIS QUESTION IS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT ALL SUCH ISSUES BE VENTILATED IN PUBLIC SESSION, AND SOME OF THEM MAY INDEED BE DEALT WITH INFORMALLY. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS DESIRABLE FOR THE EXPERTS TO GIVE ALL POSSIBLE HELP TO THE SECRETARIAT SO THAT DRAFTING OFFICERS ARE NOT FORCED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING ACCEPTABLE AND BALANCED FORMULATIONS WITHOUT ADEQUATE GUIDANCE. WE WOULD PARTICULARLY HOPE TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE SOME DELEGATIONS MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO WITHHOLD THEIR ENDORSEMENT OF THE FINAL DRAFT.

MY QUESTION IS, WHAT IS THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE WAY FOR US TO PROCEED? SHOULD THE CHAIRMAN POSE SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES FOR MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION? OR SHOULD WE WAIT FOR THE SECRETARIAT'S FIRST DRAFT IN ORDER TO FOCUS ON AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT IN TERMS OF PROPOSAL TO REVISE THE DRAFT? PERHAPS, IF THE DRAFTING OFFICERS HAVE DIFFICULTY IN TREATING A PARTICULAR ISSUE IN A BALANCED MANNER, THEY COULD, THROUGH THE CHAIRMAN OR MR. BJORNERSTEDT, REFER THE MATTER TO THE EXPERTS FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE.

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Message Attributes

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